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Abstract 
On March 4th 2016 the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision published a consultative 
document where a new methodology, called the Standardized Measurement Approach 
(SMA), is introduced for computing Operational Risk regulatory capital for banks. In this 
note, the behavior of the SMA is studied under a variety of hypothetical and realistic 
conditions, showing that the simplicity of the new approach is very costly on other 
aspects: we find that the SMA does not respond appropriately to changes in the risk 
profile of a bank, nor is it capable of differentiating among the range of possible risk 
profiles across banks; that SMA capital results generally appear to be more variable 
across banks than the previous AMA option of fitting the loss data; that the SMA can 
result in banks over- or under-insuring against operational risks relative to previous AMA 
standards. Finally, we argue that the SMA is not only retrograde in terms of its capability 
to measure risk, but perhaps more importantly, it fails to create any link between 
management actions and capital requirement. 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Operational Risk measurement, AMA, SMA, BCBS, risk profile, capital requirement, 
capital variability, operational risk management. 
  
                                                          
1
 Intesa Sanpaolo, Enterprise Risk Management Department 
2
 Credit Suisse, Operational Risk Management – Capital 
*
 The views and statements expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect 
the views of Intesa Sanpolo Spa  and its affiliates (“Intesa Sanpaolo”) or Credit Suisse Group AG and its 
affiliates (“Credit Suisse”).  Intesa Sanpaolo and Credit Suisse provide no guarantee with respect to the 
content and completeness of the article and disclaims responsibility for any use of the article. 
2 
 
Introduction 
On March 4th 2016 the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision published a consultative document 
aimed to revise the entire minimum regulatory capital framework for operational risk (BCBS, 2016).  
This document proposes to replace all the currently available options for computing regulatory 
capital (BIA, TSA-ASA, AMA) with a single standardized measure  called the Standardized 
Measurement Approach (SMA).   The goal of the SMA is to enhance the simplicity of the capital 
calculation and promote greater comparability among banks, while retaining a degree of risk-
sensitivity.   
The SMA is undeniably simple.  However, we take issue with the notion that it promotes 
comparability across banks, nor is the SMA as risk-sensitive as we might desire it to be.    We base 
this evaluation on a study of the behavior of the SMA under a variety of hypothetical and realistic 
conditions, from which we derive several conclusions. 
First, the SMA does not respond appropriately to changes in the risk profile of a bank, nor is it 
capable of strongly differentiating among the range of possible risk profiles across banks.    For one, 
the SMA does not grow in proportion to expected operational losses, as one would expect of a 
capital measure.  At most, there can be a 50% difference in capital requirements between two 
banks of similar size and yet at the extreme ends of the possible loss profiles under the SMA.  
Under the AMA or similar Value-at-Risk (VaR) type models, there would be more than a factor of 30 
difference between the capital levels at these banks, indicating that the SMA is not appropriately 
risk-sensitive. 
Second, SMA capital results generally appear to be more variable across banks than a simple AMA-
type risk model would be that has been fitted to the loss data.  The SMA is closely associated with a 
measure of bank income, which is imperfectly correlated with operational losses.   Based on 
industry survey data collected from the ORX consortium (ORX, 2016), we find that the range of 
income levels observed together with a given operational loss profile can vary quite widely.   This 
high degree of variability indicates that the SMA cannot achieve comparability, as banks with 
similar risk profiles may be assigned quite different levels of capital under the SMA. 
Third, the SMA can result in banks over- or under-insuring against operational risks relative to AMA-
level standards.   Note that the SMA is not tied to any risk measure or standard, as the AMA 
measure was tied to the 99.9th percentile VaR of the annual total loss distribution.  In our 
investigations, we find an extreme range of possible confidence levels associated with the SMA, 
which can be as low as the 99th percentile and as the high as the 99.9999th percentile, or more.  This 
provides further evidence that the method does not sufficiently differentiate among risk profiles. 
 
Description of the SMA approach 
The main component of the SMA is a measure of business volume called the Business Indicator (BI), 
which is based on the main elements of Gross Income (today’s driver for the BIA and the TSA), 
mingled with some indicators of expenses (including operational losses). The BI is composed of the 
sum of the 3-year averages of: 
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 the Interest, Lease and Dividend Component (ILDC), which is basically the Net Interest 
margin, including net operating and financial lease results and dividend income; 
 the Service Component (SC), which includes the maximum of Fee Income and Fee 
Expenses, as well as the maximum of Other Income and Other Expenses; 
 the Financial Component (FC), which includes the absolute value of the P&L of the Trading 
Book and the absolute value of the P&L of the Banking Book. 
That is, the BI can be expressed thus: 
                       
The BI represents the single determining factor of the BI Component (BIC), which is  the base value 
of the SMA. The BIC is obtained by applying a specific coefficient plus an offset to the BI. The 
coefficient and the offset depend on the size bucket of the BI as shown in the following  table. 
BI range (€) BIC Formula 
0 – 1 bn 0.11∙BI 
1 – 3 bn 110m + 0.15∙(BI - 1 bn) 
3 – 10 bn 410m + 0.19∙(BI - 3 bn) 
10 – 30 bn 1.74bn + 0.23∙(BI - 10 bn) 
> 30 bn 6.34bn + 0.29∙(BI - 30 bn) 
Table 1.  BI component of the SMA as a function of the BI indicator. The progressive behavior 
(more than linear) is explicit in the different coefficients applied to the different buckets of BI. 
The piecewise linear relationship between the BI and the BIC is shown in the following graph, which 
shows the progressive (super-linear) nature of the BIC in relation to the BI. 
 
Figure 1.  BI component of the SMA as a function of the BI indicator. The progressive behavior 
(more than linear) is clearly seen from the graph.  
 
To supplement the BIC and take into account the different risk profiles of banks of similar size,  the 
BCBS introduced a modifier to the BIC based on individual bank’s internal losses termed the Loss 
Component (LC).  The LC is required only for banks having a BI greater than €1 bn and is calculated 
according to the following expression: 
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where  x represents  individual losses experienced over a period of 10 years, and  * + represents 
the indicator function, which equals 0 if the condition inside the brackets is false, and 1 otherwise. 
The LC can be expressed as a multiple of the total annual expected loss, as follows:  
           
where EL is the expected loss and the risk factor    is given by 
                   
Here,      and      are the fractions of total losses exceeding 10 or 100 million, respectively, i.e., 
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The risk factor    can take values as low as 7 – for banks that have only experienced losses smaller 
than €10mn (i.e.,           ) – or as high as 19, for banks that have only experienced losses 
greater than €100mn (i.e.,           ).   These extreme outcomes define the range of loss 
profiles that can be differentiated by the LC; hence    represents the SMA’s measure of the 
riskiness of the bank. 
The LC enters into the SMA as a multiplier of the BIC for banks having a BI greater than €1 bn.   (The 
LC does not play any role for banks with BI less than €1bn.)  The exact formula is  
    {
             
       (          )    (    
  
   
)          
 
For banks with BI greater than €1bn, if the LC is larger (resp. smaller) than the BIC, the SMA will be 
larger (smaller) than the BIC.   When the LC is exactly equal to the BIC (as the BCBS claims will be 
true for the “industry average bank”), then the SMA will also coincide with the BIC.  
 
Considerations on the SMA 
The objective of the minimum capital requirement should be to protect the bank from the effects 
of unexpected losses, creating a buffer in term of capital that would be enough to absorb those 
losses with a reasonable degree of certainty.  In the current AMA framework, this degree of 
certainty is defined as the 99.9% VaR level of confidence in the annual total loss distribution.    As 
mentioned above, the SMA is not directly linked to any such risk measure or standard, and the 
operational loss profile is explicitly represented through the Loss Component, which as we have 
seen can be reduced to an expected loss component (EL) times a risk factor   .  The risk factor 
increases if a bank changes from having a predominantly high-frequency, low-intensity (HFLI) loss 
profile, to a more low-frequency, high-intensity (LFHI) loss profile.   
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Consistent with the objective stated above, we should expect the SMA (or any reasonable measure 
of capital under a heavy-tailed loss regime) to have the following properties: 
1. A bank with high EL should have significantly more capital than a bank with low EL, 
assuming the risk factors at these banks are the same. 
2. A bank with a LFHI risk factor should have significantly more capital than a bank with an 
HFLI risk factor, assuming that the EL at these banks is the same. 
However, the SMA obeys neither of these properties.  The main component of the SMA is clearly 
the size of the business rather than the loss profile.  In fact, the role played by losses is rather mild 
overall: the effect of an 100% increase in the Loss Component would be no greater than a 33%  
increase in the SMA, assuming no change in BI.  If this change in the Loss Component is strictly due 
to a change in the EL, and the BI and the risk factor α* do not change, then the ratio of the SMA to 
the EL decreases substantially, an effect that appears to be in contradiction with the first principle 
listed above.  More generally, Figure 2 indicates how the ratio of the SMA to the EL changes as the 
Loss Component changes with respect to the BI Component across the range of possible values of 
α*.  In all cases, the decrease is very rapid, as the ratio SMA/EL decreases from 30 at LC/BIC =0.5 
down to 12.5, at the point where LC/BIC=2 and α* takes its worst-case value of 19.   For a lower 
internal loss multiplier, e.g. α* = 7, the SMA/EL ratio decreases from 11 to less than 5 in the same 
range of variation for LC/BIC. 
 
Figure 2.  SMA/EL ratio for a given value of the multiplier    as a function of the ratio of the 
EL component to the BI component. In red (dashed line) the maximum possible value of 19 
(i.e. all losses > 100m). In blue (solid line) the lowest possible value of 7 (i.e. all losses < 10 m). 
The vertical line at 1 identifies the “average” bank. This plot of course applies for BI > 1 bn. 
Another interesting aspect is the effect of different risk factors α*.  Consider two banks having the 
same BI and the same EL, but where one bank has the minimum risk factor of 7 and the other the 
maximum value of 19.  The ratio between the SMA values of these two banks is bounded above by 
1.5 and depends on the LC/BIC value.  Figure 3 indicates that the maximum ratios between the SMA 
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values of these banks is obtained when the ratio of the EL to the BIC is around 0.2, corresponding to 
an LC/BIC ratio of about 1.4 for banks with a low risk profile (α* =7).  After this point, the effect 
decreases as the EL increases. This is quite counterintuitive given the second property of 
reasonable capital measures listed above: banks with a high expected loss and a high proportion of 
large losses should be capitalized significantly more in relation to banks with a lower EL. 
 
Figure 3.  Ratio of the SMA value computed with the higher Internal Loss multiplier of  19 to 
the SMA calculated  with the lower Internal Loss multiplier of 7 as a function of the EL/BIC. 
Reasonable range of EL/BIC is between 1% and 50%; larger values  are not excluded but 
should be rare (these would be very risky banks indeed). 
Theoretical case studies  
In order to understand the level of variability – and hence the consistency – of the SMA, we have 
run a number of simulation experiments.  The simulations are based on realistic assumptions 
regarding the frequency and severity of loss-generating processes commonly observed in the 
industry, as well as on the typical levels of the Business Indicator associated with banks having 
those loss profiles.    These studies show that not only is the SMA highly variable in relation to a 
simple internal model-based approach to measuring capital, but also that most banks will likely be 
over-insured against operational risk in comparison to the prior AMA standard, sometimes greatly 
so. 
Consider a very simple bank, with just one loss-generating mechanism (i.e., defined by one loss 
severity model and one loss frequency model) where all the parameters of these distributions are 
known, so that the associated capital requirement at the 99.9th percentile of the annual aggregated 
loss distribution can be easily derived.   In this  simple but sufficiently realistic case, the bank can be 
described using three parameters: its average frequency , assuming a Poisson distribution; and the 
shape  and location µ of its severity distribution, assuming a lognormal distribution.   Using the 
standard method of the Loss Distribution Approach (LDA), it is possible to aggregate the frequency 
and severity  distributions to arrive at the AMA capital requirement.   In addition, the distribution of 
the Loss Component of the SMA can also be derived. 
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To fully compute the SMA capital requirement, however, we must additionally make certain 
assumptions regarding the size of the Business Indicator and its relationship to the Loss 
Component.    Based on a survey of 54 banks conducted by the ORX consortium, we have data on 
the Loss Component and Business Indicator Components over a three-year period from 2013-2015.   
There is a strong correlation between the two components, as shown in the graph below. 
 
Figure 4.  ORX survey data of BIC and LC values over a three-year period, collected from 54 
consortium members. 
Using a simple transformation of the data, it is possible to determine a linear relationship between 
these two components.   A ordinary least-squares regression of the log of the BI Component against 
the log of the log of the Loss Component, as shown in the graph at left below, indicates that the 
residuals are fairly Normal in character, as evidenced by the quantile-quantile plot of the regression 
residuals, below right.  
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Figure 5.  Fitted regression of log(BIC) on log(log(LC)) (left graph) and quantile-quantile plot of 
residuals against a Normal distribution (right graph).  
Various statistical tests of these residuals (Anderson-Darling, Shapiro-Wilk, Cramer-von Mises, 
Lilliefors, etc.) all pass at the 5% significance level, confirming that the residuals are reasonably 
consistent with a Normal distribution.   The fitted regression is expressed as  
    (   )                (   (  ))       (1) 
where   is a Normal random variable with mean 0 and standard deviation 0.486.     We have used 
this regression relation to simulate realistic values of the BI Component, given the value of the 
expected Loss Component derived from the assumed parameters. 
In order to ensure that the assumed Poisson and Lognormal parameters are themselves within a 
reasonable range, we assume that the following relationships hold, in keeping with the ranges of 
these values reported by ORX. 
A. The AMA capital level (99.9th percentile of the annual aggregate loss distribution) implied 
by the parameters exceeds €10mn and is less than €50bn. 
B. The expected value of the Loss Component exceeds €64mn and is less than €150bn. 
C. The ratio of the frequency of losses exceeding €20,000 to the median Business Indicator 
(determined by the BI Component from the regression line, expressed in billions of euro) 
exceeds 20.  
The simulation procedure was executed as follows: 
1. Select values of the Poisson parameter λ and the lognormal parameters μ and σ.   
2. Determine the implied AMA capital level, expected Loss Component, median BI 
component, and frequency of losses exceeding €20,000. 
3. If the three conditions (A)-(C) hold, then run the following procedure 100 times: 
a. Simulate 10 years of loss data based on the assumed Poisson and Lognormal 
distributions 
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b. Compute the Loss Component from this data 
c.  Generate a BI Component based the expected Loss Component using the 
regression equation (1) 
d. Compute the SMA requirement based on the Loss Component and BI Component 
e. Fit a Lognormal and Poisson distribution to the loss data exceeding €10,000 (the 
data collection floor for the SMA), and compute the AMA capital levels implied by 
the estimated parameters.   The capital levels were determined using the single-
loss approximation (SLA) formula 
     ̂  (  
       
 ̂
)   ̂    ̂   
where  ̂ represents the fitted lognormal distribution (left-truncated at €10,000),  
   is the mean of this distribution, and   ̂ is the estimated frequency of losses 
exceeding €10,000. 
4. Based on the 100 realizations of the SMA and internal-model based capital (which we shall 
refer to as SLA capital), compute the following quantities of interest: 
a. The coefficient of variation of the SMA capital, i.e., the standard deviation divided 
by the mean of the 100 realizations. 
b. The coefficient of variation of the SLA capital. 
In the simulations, we allowed the value of μ to range between 8 and 12, σ to range between 1 and 
4, and λ to be in the set {100, 500, 1000, 5000, 10000}.  (Note that λ represents the mean frequency 
of all losses, no matter how small.   The number of losses used in fitting the parameters in step (3e) 
of the simulation procedure was based only on the realized losses exceeding €10,000, which was 
usually a much lower number than λ, depending on the value of μ and σ.  In all, 315 combinations 
of values were tested, of which only 134 met conditions (A)-(C). 
The results indicate that the SMA results are generally considerably more variable than the internal 
model based SLA results.   The graph below shows that the coefficient of variation of the SMA is 
consistently well above that of the SLA, for all values of the (expected) Loss Component in the 
range observed in the industry.  The primary reason for the high variability of the SMA is that the BI 
Component is so variable – i.e., banks of many sizes can have a similar Loss Component – that it 
cannot serve as a highly reliable indicator of risk.  By contrast, the simple internal model-based  
outcomes show better overall variability. 
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Figure 6.  Simulation results comparing the coefficient of variation of the SMA results for each 
parameter setting to the results based on the internal model fit. 
We can obtain a more granular view of the relation between the SMA and the true VaR capital at 
the 99.9th percentile by examining a range of numeric results for certain specific combinations of 
parameters.   A second set of results were determined according to a slightly modified procedure.  
First, a certain level of the Business Indicator (in billions) is assumed, using the example of a small 
bank (BI of €8bn), a medium bank (BI of €20bn), and a large bank (BI of €40bn); these selections 
also determine the BIC.  Next, the expected value of the Loss Component is determined using 
equation (1), considering three different quantiles of the stochastic (Normal) component (10%, 50% 
and 90%), thus obtaining a low, a median and a high LC/BIC ratio.  For each of these 9 combinations 
of BI and LC, the parameters µ and  are chosen in order to assess three different regimes of the  α* 
parameter: a low value (around 8), a medium value (around 11) and a high value (around 15) so 
that situations dominated by losses below €10m up to those with large losses are considered.  For a 
given value of α*, two combinations of µ and  are also selected in order to have a wide range of 
possible frequencies.  Based on the LC and α* parameter, we may of course determine the values of 
EL and λ.   
To understand level of insurance that the SMA is providing against operational losses in each case, 
denote by   (   ) the value of the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of the aggregate annual 
loss distribution at the level of the SMA.   We find it convenient to represent   (   ) in terms of 
the “number of 9’s” in the decimal representation.  For example, the standard AMA level measures 
the 0.999 confidence level of annual total losses, which is the “three-9’s” level.   If the SMA 
corresponds to the 0.99 or 0.9999 level, this would be “two-9’s” and “four-9’s” respectively.   In 
general, the “number of 9’s” measure is determined by the following formula: 
           (    (   ))  
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The specific values of the input parameters  that were tested (BI, µ,   and the quantile) are 
displayed in the left-hand columns in Table 2 below. From these values, all other columns are 
computed;  note that all of these quantities are derived conditional on the losses exceeding 10,000 
euro, in keeping with the SMA data requirements.  (In the table, rows which would be rejected 
under condition (C) are printed in have gray text using italics.)  In this case, the 99.9th percentile 
(referred to as VaR in the table) was determined by using the Fast Fourier Transform (FFT).  The 
final columns indicates the ratio of the  SMA to the true 99.9th percentile (SMA / VaR) and the 
number of 9’s associated with the SMA.  These quantities are direct indications of the capability of 
the SMA to capture the theoretical risk profile.  
Reviewing these results, it is clear that the SMA is materially overestimating the theoretical  VaR for 
small values of α* (values close to the theoretical minimum of 7). Conversely, when α* is large, in 
the range of 14-16, the SMA is generally underestimating VaR.   Many of these cases however did 
not meet condition (C), and therefore may not correspond to actual banks.  Among the median 
values (10-12) of α*, we do not observe perfectly consistent results, although in the majority of 
cases, the SMA overestimates VaR. 
The “number of 9’s” associated with the SMA percentile level in this experiment ranges widely, 
with some outcomes below the two-9’s level, indicating that the SMA would represent only about 
the once-per-100-year event, and other outcomes above the six-9’s level, in which case the bank is 
quite heavily over-insured against operational risk. 
 
Figure 7.  Simulation results showing the median “number of 9’s” in the decimal 
representation of the SMA percentiles with respect to the true annual aggregate loss 
distribution, for the test cases in Table 2.  The red line indicates the three-9’s level at which 
the AMA is calibrated. 
In addition, the primary driver of the SMA is clearly bank size (income), whereas the VaR measure is 
mainly driven by the loss profile.  As a result, there is a range of risk factors α* that are consistent 
with a fixed set of BI and LC values, indicating that a wide variety of risk profiles, with very different 
levels of VaR, are consistent with the same level of the SMA. 
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Table 2.  Comparison between the SMA and the theoretical capital requirement (VaR) under a 
range of situations. 
 
  
BI & BIC (bn) µ  quantile LC(bn)  α* EL(bn) SMA(bn) VaR(bn) SMA/VaR #9's
low 0.390 735 0.055 0.980 0.116 8.5 6.5
median 0.876 1,650 0.122 1.185 0.207 5.7 6.3
high 2.195 4,133 0.307 1.615 0.427 3.8 6.2
low 0.390 323 0.050 0.980 0.203 4.8 5.0
median 0.876 724 0.113 1.185 0.329 3.6 4.8
high 2.195 1,814 0.283 1.615 0.601 2.7 4.7
low 0.390 71 0.036 0.980 0.709 1.4 3.3
median 0.876 159 0.080 1.185 1.140 1.0 3.0
high 2.195 398 0.201 1.615 1.942 0.8 2.8
low 0.390 42 0.034 0.980 0.786 1.2 3.2
median 0.876 94 0.075 1.185 1.259 0.9 2.9
high 2.195 236 0.189 1.615 2.128 0.8 2.7
low 0.390 12 0.026 0.980 1.729 0.6 2.7
median 0.876 28 0.058 1.185 3.123 0.4 2.4
high 2.195 69 0.145 1.615 5.950 0.3 2.2
low 0.390 5 0.024 0.980 2.057 0.5 2.6
median 0.876 12 0.054 1.185 3.846 0.3 2.3
high 2.195 30 0.134 1.615 7.579 0.2 2.1
low 1.722 1,424 0.222 3.108 0.509 6.1 5.7
median 4.728 3,909 0.610 4.279 1.044 4.1 5.6
high 14.887 12,305 1.921 6.740 2.606 2.6 5.5
low 1.722 862 0.213 3.108 0.552 5.6 5.6
median 4.728 2,367 0.584 4.279 1.094 3.9 5.5
high 14.887 7,450 1.840 6.740 2.639 2.6 5.4
low 1.722 312 0.158 3.108 1.688 1.8 3.5
median 4.728 857 0.434 4.279 3.033 1.4 3.3
high 14.887 2,699 1.365 6.740 6.002 1.1 3.1
low 1.722 185 0.148 3.108 1.853 1.7 3.5
median 4.728 508 0.407 4.279 3.295 1.3 3.3
high 14.887 1,598 1.281 6.740 6.407 1.1 3.1
low 1.722 54 0.114 3.108 5.031 0.6 2.7
median 4.728 149 0.312 4.279 10.012 0.4 2.4
high 14.887 470 0.982 6.740 21.240 0.3 2.2
low 1.722 24 0.105 3.108 6.356 0.5 2.6
median 4.728 65 0.289 4.279 13.062 0.3 2.3
high 14.887 203 0.911 6.740 28.533 0.2 2.0
low 6.781 5,605 0.875 8.299 1.377 6.0 6.4
median 22.418 18,531 2.893 13.091 3.697 3.5 5.4
high 87.153 72,041 11.246 22.127 12.497 1.8 5.8
low 6.781 3,394 0.838 8.299 1.426 5.8 6.3
median 22.418 11,220 2.771 13.091 3.706 3.5 6.0
high 87.153 43,618 10.773 22.127 12.206 1.8 5.8
low 6.781 1,229 0.622 8.299 3.748 2.2 3.8
median 22.418 4,064 2.056 13.091 7.726 1.7 3.6
high 87.153 15,801 7.992 22.127 18.838 1.2 3.3
low 6.781 728 0.583 8.299 4.052 2.0 3.7
median 22.418 2,407 1.929 13.091 8.185 1.6 3.5
high 87.153 9,356 7.499 22.127 19.377 1.1 3.2
low 6.781 214 0.447 8.299 12.720 0.7 2.7
median 22.418 708 1.479 13.091 27.615 0.5 2.4
high 87.153 2,752 5.750 22.127 64.962 0.3 2.1
low 6.781 93 0.415 8.299 16.763 0.5 2.5
median 22.418 306 1.372 13.091 37.415 0.3 2.3
high 87.153 1,191 5.334 22.127 89.801 0.2 1.9
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Finally, we can observe a strong relationship between VaR and EL, given the value of the risk factor 
α*, in the examples shown in Table 2.    Figure 8 plots these outcomes on a log-scale, with 
regression lines superimposed corresponding to each value of α*, estimated so as to have a 
common slope.  The distance between the upper and lower lines is 3.5, which indicates that the 
VaR level when  α* = 16.3 is about exp(3.5) = 33 times the value of the VaR level when α* = 7.2.   
Compare this value with the factor of 1.5 indicated earlier as the maximum possible difference 
between the worst-case and best-case risk profiles under the SMA.    
 
Figure 8.  Plot of VaR against EL values from Table 2, plotted on a log scale.  Each line 
represents a regression of log(VaR) against log(EL) for a different value of α*, which ranges in 
the set {7.2, 7.7, 8.1, 10.9, 11.6, 15.2, 16.3} in the examples.  The lowest regression line 
corresponds to  α* = 7.2, and the highest to  α* = 16.3.     
Based on the fact that banks with a high value of α*, and hence a very high percentage of very large 
losses, have a substantially lower SMA compared to the theoretical risk profile expressed by the 
VaR, a systematic bias is introduced by the use of the SMA in the population of banks.   The effect 
of this bias can be typically seen for large international banks that are exposed to large fines and 
penalties related to conduct risk3.  These banks are mainly based in the US, or have a large US 
footprint.   Thus, one would expect that the impact of the SMA on US banks would be minimal, or 
possibly even a reduction in capital, whereas the impact on other jurisdictions would be to increase 
the capital requirement, in some cases to a large degree. This expectation has recently been 
confirmed in the results of the cited ORX Survey (ORX, 2016). 
 
 
 
                                                          
3
 Fines of tens of billions of dollars have been common in the past years for cases related to subprime 
mortgages and violation of international sanctions or other financial misconduct. 
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Conclusions 
While the SMA may represent an improvement over other, standardized methods for calculating 
capital, it still belongs squarely in the category of size-driven capital standards, as the influence of 
the loss profile is quite minimal.   As the simulation tests have indicated, it is certainly not a highly 
risk-sensitive measure.  
Replacing the AMA with the SMA would represent a material step backward in the capability of 
banks to effectively hold capital against their operational risk exposure.  Although it was well-
known (and often publicly expressed, see e.g. Cope et al., 2010) by most banks that the AMA 
suffers from serious problems, the ability of an internal models-based approach to setting capital is 
still far higher than that of the proposed SMA.    
The SMA is not only retrograde in terms of its capability to measure risk, but perhaps more 
importantly, it fails to create any link between management actions and capital requirement.   
Consider again two banks of the same size and loss profile that discover a similar operational 
vulnerability.  One of these banks decides to invest heavily in improvements (controls, resources, 
exiting legally risky environments etc.), while the second bank decides to do absolutely nothing. 
Under the SMA, both banks will continue to carry a similar capital requirement for many years.  On 
the other hand, with the AMA, the first bank has the possibility to demonstrate the reduced risk 
profile through forward-looking internal estimates. While still not perfect, the AMA is at least  
directionally correct on this issue, while the SMA will reward bad practices and will penalize, in 
relative terms, good banks.      
In most jurisdictions, the Pillar I minimum capital is considered as a floor for any Pillar II estimates. 
If the calibration of the SMA is kept at the proposed level, the use of internal models for Pillar II will 
also be hampered for low risk banks.  Banks will therefore have very little incentive to invest in a 
costly Pillar II process if it will have no influence on the final binding level for the capital ratios. 
Very few people would say that the AMA is a perfect method for determining capital.  At bottom, it 
suffers from problems of design and implementation, which have led to the symptoms that are 
now leading the Basel committee towards adopting a universal standardized approach.  In 
particular, the choice of 99.9th percentile as the measurement standard essentially guaranteed that 
the bank-internal models would not return results that were either stable or comparable.   Based 
on the amount of data that banks have, it is  not feasible to estimate the once-per-thousand-year 
annual loss with any degree of precision.  Moreover, given the difficulty of achieving stable or 
usable results, the models became more and more complex as banks continued to apply more 
conditions and selection criteria.   In addition, regulators in different jurisdictions applied the Basel 
rules differently, creating global imbalances in capital levels. 
Therefore it is no wonder that we observe today a lack of simplicity and comparability in the AMA 
models – this outcome was virtually guaranteed from the start.  However, this should not be 
interpreted as an indictment of internal models generally.  There have been many proposals put 
forward that could improve the accuracy and robustness of an internal models framework, 
including basing the capital on a more attainable measurement standard, developing industry 
benchmarks, restricting the range of modeling practice, and allowing causal or structural models to 
supplement the statistical VaR models.   Just because the 99.9th percentile cannot be reliably 
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estimated from a limited supply of data does not mean that internal models should have no role to 
play in determining the capital charge. 
It would be a mistake to revert to a fully standardized approach such as the SMA.  As we have 
shown, this measure fails according to two of the three desired outcomes that the Basel Committee 
put forward – comparability and risk-sensitivity.  The SMA only succeeds in being simple.  One may 
however do well to question why simplicity is even an objective at all, given the breadth and variety 
of operational risks affecting banks today.   
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